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Abstract 
Several authors have noted that in a non-regulated environment the development 
of public transport service is self-adjusting: Faced with decreasing demand, operators 
will tend to reduce service to cut costs, resulting in a decrease in the level-of-service, 
which then triggers a further drop in demand. The opposite may also occur: high 
demand will induce the operator to increase supply, e.g. through an increase in 
frequency, which results in a higher level-of-service and a subsequent increase in 
passenger numbers, triggering another round of service improvements. This paper 
adds to the literature by presenting an analytic model for analyzing these phenomena 
of vicious or virtuous cycles. The model formalizes passengers’ decisions to use a 
public transport service depending on waiting time and employs field data regarding 
passengers’ variation in willingness-to-wait for a public transport service. The paper 
investigates the dynamics of the line service and shows how the emergence of a 
vicious or virtuous cycle depends on total number of potential passengers and share of 
captive riders. It ends with a discussion of the implications of the findings for the 
planning of public transport services.  
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1. What is vicious cycle? 
When a bus line operator is faced with low demand, he tends to cut expenses 
instead of improving level-of-service (LOS) (Reinhold, 2008). The easiest way to do 
that is to reduce the frequency of buses. In response, some of the passengers may use 
the service less or not at all, as they change transportation mode, destination choice, 
or decide to forego a trip altogether (Castaline, 1980; Bly, 1987).
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 This decrease in the 
demand for the bus service may cause a further decrease in bus frequency. This 
vicious cycle continues until only captive passengers, who do not have an alternative 
mode of travel, continue using the line (Downs, 1962).  
The positive, virtuous cycle, is also observed: high demand for a bus line induces 
the operator to supply more buses and this causes an increase in LOS and perceived 
satisfaction of passengers. Non-captive passengers react to the improvement, switch 
from private cars to buses (Liu et al., 2010), leading to a rise in demand (Kingham et 
al., 2001), which in turn triggers a further increase in LOS.  
The above negative and positive cycles are well known among transportation 
researchers and have been investigated both theoretically (Martens and Hurvitz, 2011) 
and in practice, as in Xu et al. (2010), who mention in their review of the history of 
the public transportation network in Beijing that poor public transportation systems 
may lead to lines’ vicious cycle. In contrast, Reinhold (2008), in a study of Berlin bus 
network, shows that a virtuous cycle can be induced, even when facing a declining 
revenue stream from passengers. By deliberately increasing the frequency on a limited 
number of main bus lines, while cutting service on supplementary lines to reduce total 
operating costs, in combination with improvements in communication and marketing, 
the Berlin bus operator succeeded to boost ridership on lines with frequency 
increases, resulting in a substantial rise in overall passenger volume and revenues.  
Levinson and Krizek (2008) were the first who tried to investigate the vicious 
cycle analytically. They introduced three hypothetical dependencies: one linear, of 
bus speed as a function of bus waiting time, and two non-linear, of the number of 
passengers as a function of bus speed, and of waiting time as a function of the number 
of passengers that use the line. The non-linear dependencies resulted in a qualitative 
conclusion that the bus line has two stable states – one in which the bus waiting time 
is very high and the number of passengers is close to zero, and the other, in which the 
waiting time is close to zero and all potential riders use transit. At the same time, the 
dependencies they used are purely hypothetical and the authors do not propose any 
mechanisms that can explain them. As a result, the number of passengers in an 
equilibrium state is unrealistically high or low (see Appendix C for more details).  
                                                 
1
 Passengers may indeed respond in all these ways to a change in service frequency. For reasons of 
readability only, in the remainder of the paper we will limit these possible behavioral responses to 
mode change among non-captive travelers. This limitation has no consequences for the results 
presented in the paper. 
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In what follows, we construct a model of the vicious cycle phenomenon as an 
outcome of passengers’ willingness-to-wait for a bus. The model is based on the 
assumption that the bus operator is interested to maximize its profits (Van Nes, 2002). 
Based on experimental data on willingness-to-wait for a bus, we develop a full 
analytical model of the interaction between the passengers and the bus company, and 
formulate the conditions when the negative (vicious) or positive (virtuous) cycles 
emerge. Following the tradition, we call the phenomenon “vicious cycle” and the 
model “the vicious cycle model”. The aim of the paper is to provide a systematic 
understanding of the dynamics of the vicious cycle under various circumstances. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our assumption 
regarding the distribution of passengers’ willingness-to-wait for a bus, based on a 
brief overview of surveys into the issue. Then, in section 3, we analyze the interplay 
between passengers’ willingness-to-wait and public transport frequency. Based on 
this, we present the dynamics of the vicious cycle as dependent on total number of 
potential passengers and share of captive riders (Section 4). Section 5 applies the 
model to the problems of bus size and the introduction of a new line. We end with a 
discussion in which we elaborate on the relevance of the findings for real-life public 
transport service and suggest some directions for further refinement of the model 
(Section 6).  
2. Field estimates of passengers’ willingness-to-wait for a bus  
Public transport ridership depends on a diversity of factors, such as in-vehicle 
travel time, walking distance to a bus stop, walkability of the urban environment, 
public transport fares, as well as the quality and cost of alternative modes of transport. 
Among these factors, waiting time is particularly important, as riders view waiting 
time as much more burdensome than an equivalent amount of time spent in travel 
(Ceder, 2007). Conventional wisdom holds that average waiting time equals one half 
of the expected headway (the time gap between two consecutive buses) (Hess et al., 
2004). While passengers can reduce their waiting time by synchronizing their arrival 
at a public transport stop with the service schedule, this strategy is only effective if 
transit service is reliable. Moreover, the strategy often only replaces waiting time at 
the stop with hidden waiting time at the origin of a trip (i.e., at home) (Furth and 
Muller, 2006).  
The willingness-to-wait for a bus or other public transport service varies among 
passengers, as has been shown in various surveys performed over the past two 
decades estimating the distribution of the maximal bus waiting time τ that passengers 
are ready to accept.   
Peterson et al. (2006), in a stated preference survey, studied how long bus users 
are willing to wait for a free transfer between two bus operators. They obtained that 
only 10% of the respondents indicated to be willing to wait for more than 15 minutes 
and only 3% for more than 20 minutes. Kim and Ceder (2006) asked potential 
passengers if they would use a planned shuttle service as depending on the time 
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interval between buses. Half of the passengers responded that they definitely or 
probably accept a 5 or a 10 minutes waiting time, while more than 70% raised doubts 
that they would wait for 15 minutes or more. In a city-wide survey conducted in 
Dublin, 90% of the respondents claimed that they are not willing to wait for more than 
20 minutes, and 70% were not willing to wait for more than 10 minutes (Caulfield and 
O'Mahony, 2009). Only 2% claimed they would be willing to wait more than 30 
minutes.  
Since stated preference studies do not necessarily accurately reflect people’s 
revealed preferences, it is worthwhile to compare these findings with a revealed 
preference survey. In such a survey, Hess et al. (2004) studied the transport behavior 
of college students who had the choice between two identical bus lines serving the 
same origin-destination pair, one line served by blue buses and the other by green 
buses. Students could ride for free on the ‘blue’ bus (with the university paying for the 
fare on behalf of the student), but had to pay a fare of 0.75 US $ for a ride on the 
‘green’ bus. The headway between buses on the blue line was on average 10 minutes; 
between green buses, it was 12 minutes. Hess et al. (2004) measured the waiting time 
of the students who decided to wait for a blue bus rather than board a green bus when 
the latter arrived first at the bus stop. They found that the average additional waiting 
time for these riders was 5.8 minutes (with an STD of 3.3 minutes); the median 
elapsed time was 4.5 minutes. With a headway of 10 minutes between the blue buses, 
these findings are largely in line with the conventional wisdom that actual waiting 
time equals, on average, one-half of the expected headway. Since virtually all students 
used the bus line on a regular basis, they will have had a relatively accurate estimate 
of the expected additional waiting time when deciding not to board an available green 
bus. The findings can thus be interpreted as students’ actual willingness-to-wait for a 
bus. Important for the purposes of this paper, is the finding that the distribution of 
willingness-to-wait time is comparable to those found in stated preference studies (see 
below). Hence, we conclude that stated preference findings can be used for the 
analysis of the vicious cycle phenomenon. 
Figure 1 presents the results of the two stated preference surveys of passengers’ 
willingness-to-wait that are employed in our model. The results have been derived 
from the studies of Peterson et al. (2006) and Caulfield and O’Mahony (2009). We 
approximate these empirical distribution densities by the function             , 
with the values of parameters a and b estimated using the non-linear regression 
method of SPSS19 and C serving as a normalizing constant for ensuring     
  
 
  . 
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Figure 1: Experimental distributions of passengers’ willingness-to-wait time , 
approximated by the function             . 
 
The reaction of the passenger population to waiting time and, hence, to bus 
frequency, is crucial for understanding modal shift between car and bus (Kingham et 
al., 2001) or, more generally speaking, for understanding bus use. Hence, it is a key 
element in the model of the vicious cycle and in what follows we perform a deep 
analytical investigation of this phenomenon. We intentionally ignore other factors that 
influence the usage of public transport, such as accessibility of destinations, comfort 
of the service, car travel times, or parking availability and costs. These factors 
obviously will have an impact on the occurrence of vicious and virtuous cycles in a 
real-world setting, but do not change the fundamental dynamics of the phenomenon.  
3. From willingness-to-wait to bus line dynamics 
The model considers a circular bus line of a trip time L. Let the entire population 
that can be served by the line during this trip be indicated by Ptotal, the fraction of 
captive passengers by g, and the fraction of non-captive passengers by 1 – g, i.e. the 
line population consists of gPtotal captive passengers and of N = (1 - g)Ptotal non-
captive passengers. Captive passengers always make the trip, while non-captive 
passengers decide on using a bus depending on the time τ they have to wait at a stop. 
Let us denote as N() the number of non-captive passengers whose maximal waiting 
time is between  and  + d, that is,      
 
 
     . 
Let us consider the dynamics of the passengers taking the line at a daily time 
resolution. At a given day d, some non-captive passengers who waited for the bus that 
day longer than their maximal waiting time τ, may decide to stop using the bus line in 
the future. We assume that this decision is made after several failures and, thus, the 
fraction of those who left at a day d is lower than the fraction of those who waited for 
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too long that day. In parallel, we assume that some of the non-captive passengers, 
who currently do not use the bus, attempt to use it in the hope that the waiting time is 
reduced in comparison to previous experiences. Some of them may succeed to board 
several times in a row after waiting less than τ and may thus change their mode back 
to the bus. 
Let B(d) be the number of buses serving the line at a day d and TB(d) be the time 
interval between buses (TB(d) = L/B(d)). Let us further assume that every passenger 
uses the bus once a day and that the daily rate at which passengers switch from being 
a user to becoming a non-user is β, while the rate of the opposite switch is α.  Users 
for which τ        are all served, while users with τ        are served if they arrive 
to the stop τ minutes or less before the bus arrival. Assuming that the passengers 
arrive to the bus stop randomly in time, the fraction of the served users among those 
of τ        is           
Let us denote the number of non-captive passengers whose maximal waiting time 
is τ and who use the bus at a day d as        , and those who do not use bus at a day 
d as        ,                     .  
The dynamics of         and         can be presented as follows:  
If  then 
                          
 
  
            
 
  
   
                          
 
  
            
 
  
 
Otherwise  
                            
                           
The number P(d) of passengers served at a day d is given by: 
                      
 
 
          (2) 
To proceed, let us assume that a bus company decides on bus frequency once in a 
quarter of a year, and that β is essentially higher than α. That is, passengers are more 
inclined to stop using a service if the bus does not arrive during their maximal waiting 
time, than to resume using the service in a hope that waiting time has decreased. 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the passengers who continue to use the bus line 
(dark grey) versus the initial distribution of the passengers by their maximal waiting 
time, at d = 0 (light and dark grey together), and after a quarter of a year (d = 90 
days), for TB = 15 min and different values of  and 
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Figure 2: The distribution of Nu(, d) at day d = 0 (light grey) and at day d = 90 
(dark grey), for  = 0.005,  = 0.05, 0.25 and 0.5 (all per day),  TB = 15 minutes and 
the distribution of willingness-to-wait according to Peterson et al. (2006), assuming 
all non-captive passengers attempt to use the bus service from day d = 0 onwards. 
 
According to Figure 2, during a three month period the majority of passengers 
with < TB = 15 leave the line in case β/α is sufficiently large.  
Below we assume that the bus company can change the bus frequency once in a 
quarter and, for simplicity, ignore passengers with < TB that continue to use the bus 
after the end of the quarter. In this case,    
 
 
        can be presented as 
               , and the dynamics of the bus users, by quarters t, can be presented as:  
                                 
 
     
           (3) 
where, as defined above, Ptotal is the overall number of potential passengers, g is 
the fraction of captive passengers among them, and t denotes a quarter of a year. 
The full model, which accounts for passengers with < TB(d) who continue to use 
the bus line, is presented in Appendix B, where we demonstrate that the dynamics of 
(3) and of the full model are qualitatively similar. 
For the next step of the analysis, let us substitute, in (3),    by L/B(t), and denote 
by m the optimal number of passengers per bus that makes it maximally profitable for 
the operator to run the line. The value of m evidently depends on the maximal 
capacity of a bus, but will be somewhat lower than that to avoid overcrowded buses 
(and thus a risk that potential passengers will have to be left behind due to a lack of 
capacity), but higher than the number of passengers necessary to merely cover 
operation costs (Meignan et al. 2007). Equation (3) can be thus finalized as  
                                  
 
  
    
                    (4) 
8 
 
Assuming that the number of buses is a continuous variable and denoting Ptotal/m 
as Rtotal, equation (4) can be transformed into the equation of bus dynamics by 
quarters of a year: 
                                          
 
 
    
           (5)    
Where B(t) = P(t)/m, and gRtotal = gPtotal/m and (1 – g)Rtotal =(1-g)Ptotal/m express 
the numbers of captive and non-captive passengers, respectively, in terms of the 
number of buses necessary to carry them. Equation (5) thus represents the dynamics 
of a bus line’s vicious cycle through the dynamics of the number of buses on the line.  
4. Study of the vicious cycle 
 The dynamics of (5) are defined by the shape of F(B(t)) (Holmgren, 1996); let 
us investigate it as dependent on Rtotal and g.  
F(B(t)) monotonously grows with the growth of B(t): F(B(t)) is an integral of a 
positive function and with the growth of B(t) the lower limit of the integral decreases. 
Asymptote: With the growth of B(t), the lower limit of the integral in (5) tends to 
zero, the integral tends to 1, and, thus, F(B)  Rtotal.  
Equilibria: Equilibrium number of buses B*, if it exists, satisfies the equation B* 
= F(B*). Equilibrium B* is locally stable if            and unstable if            
(Holmgren, 1996). For monotonously growing             is always positive and, 
thus, the conditions of local stability can be simplified: B* is stable if           and 
unstable, if         . Below, we omit the case of         . 
Analytical investigation of monotonously decreasing willingness-to-wait  () is 
presented in Appendix A: equation (5) has one or three equilibria depending on Rtotal 
and g and on whether  () decreases, with , faster or slower than 1/ in this case.  
For a real-world non-monotonous distribution of the willingness-to-wait  (), the 
possible number of equilibria of (5) is also one or three. To investigate the stability of 
these equilibria, let us note that they are the points of intersection of the curve B(t+1) 
= F(B(t)) and of the straight line B(t+1) = B(t). Stability of the equilibria is thus 
defined by the tangent to F(B(t)) at the point of intersection.  
In Figure 3, four qualitatively different situations are represented regarding the 
equilibria of (5) as dependent on Rtotal and g. They are all highly intuitive: in case the 
population (Rtotal), as defined in terms of number of buses, is low (Figures 3a, 3b), the 
vicious cycle is inevitable. No matter how high the initial number of buses, the overall 
number of passengers is insufficient to (financially) justify the line and the bus 
operator will decrease bus frequency until only captive passengers will remain on the 
bus. Note that in case of high operating costs of the bus line, no equilibrium may 
actually exist, as the number of captive riders may be too low to warrant any bus 
operations.  
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The opposite case is represented by a large population (Rtotal) and a high share of 
captive riders g (Figure 3d). This situation is obviously the best for the bus operator, 
as a virtuous cycle is inevitable in this case: the high number of captive passengers 
will justify an initially high bus frequency that will automatically attract non-captive 
passengers, which will induce the operator to further increase bus frequency. As a 
result, the majority of the population will ultimately use the bus line.  
The most interesting is the case when the number of potential passengers is high, 
but the vast majority of them are not captives (Figure 3c). In this case, which is 
characteristic for the majority of cities in the developed world, the model (5) has three 
equilibria. A stable low equilibrium Blow, when the frequency of buses is low and only 
captive passengers use the line, a stable high equilibrium Bhigh, when the frequency of 
buses is high and the majority of potential passengers use the line, and an intermediate 
unstable equilibrium Bint, separating between the domains of attraction of towards the 
low and high equilibria. If the number of buses is below Bint, a typical vicious cycle 
starts; if it is above Bint, the system will enter a virtuous cycle as in the case presented 
in Figure 3d. 
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Figure 3: Four qualitatively different situations regarding the equilibria of (5), 
as dependent on Rtotal and g, for m = 50 and for the distributions f() of the 
willingness-to-wait according to Peterson et al. (2006). (a) Rtotal = 10, g = 0.2; (b) 
Rtotal = 10, g = 0.8; (c) Rtotal =25, g=0.2; (d) Rtotal = 25, g = 0.8.  
 
The bifurcation diagram (Figure 4) represents the dependence of the equilibrium 
number of buses B*, according to (5), on the size of the population of potential 
passengers if the total population in the area served by the bus line is growing. The 
diagram is constructed assuming that the characteristics of the population – the share 
g of captive riders and the distribution of willingness-to-wait for a bus among non-
captive riders – remain unaltered over the period of population growth.  
If the majority of the population consists of captive riders (e.g., a “poor area” with 
a low level of car ownership), then the bus operator will react to the increase in the 
number of committed passengers by increasing bus frequency over time, thereby also 
inducing non-captive passengers to change their transportation mode in favor of the 
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bus. This dynamics are reflected by the cross-section of the diagram for g = 0.8 
(Figure 4c).  
In case the majority of the population consists of non-captive passengers, the 
dynamics of the system are more complex. These dynamics are presented by the case 
of g = 0.2 (Figure 4b), when an initially low overall number of potential passengers 
(i.e., low Rtotal) enables one equilibrium state only, in which virtually only the captive 
passengers are served. With the increase in total population, the number of captive 
passengers will grow too and this will influence bus usage proportionally. However, 
the growth of the number of captive riders and the related increase in bus frequency 
is, in itself, insufficient for attracting a substantial number of non-captive riders and 
initiate virtuous cycle. The latter becomes possible after Rtotal (for the values of g = 
0.2 and m = 50) passes the lower threshold            
  ≈ 22, when a second stable 
equilibrium B*high emerges. From this point onwards, the public transport operator 
can force the line into the virtuous cycle by instantaneously raising the number of 
buses above the unstable equilibrium B*int (the dotted line in Figure 4b). The situation 
changes once again when the total population size passes, in terms of number of 
buses, the higher threshold           
     (again, for the values of g = 0.2 and m = 
50). From this point onwards, there is only one (high) equilibrium B*high (Figure 4b)  
Note that within the interval           
                    
   the higher is Rtotal, 
the lower is the number of additional buses that should be added by the transport 
operator to initiate the virtuous cycle, and the higher the value of the second 
equilibrium B*high to which the system will converge after that (Figure 4b). At the 
same time, if the increase in the bus frequency is insufficient and the number of buses 
added by the operator would remain below B*int, the operator will be forced back into 
the vicious cycle that will return the system to the low equilibrium B*low.  
12 
 
 
Figure 4: (a) Full bifurcation diagram of equation (4) for m = 50, varying Rtotal 
and g, and the distribution of willingness-to-wait according to Peterson et al. (2006); 
(b) cross-section of the full diagram for low fraction of captive passengers, g = 0.2; 
(c) cross-section of the full diagram for high fraction of captive passengers, g = 0.8.  
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5. Extensions of the vicious cycle model 
5.1. Bus size as a model parameter 
One option for increasing bus frequency and, thus, initiating the virtuous cycle, is 
the use of smaller buses. Putting aside operation costs, the same total capacity of a bus 
line can be achieved by serving it with a higher number of smaller buses. In model 
terms, equation (4), where the size of a bus is reflected by the parameter m, is 
convenient for analyzing the impact of such an intervention.  Just as above, if for a 
certain population size, the situation of one equilibrium (a line serving only captive 
passengers) is the only possible one (Figure 5a), then substitution of the line’s large 
buses by more smaller buses, with smaller m, can turn the dynamics into a situation 
with two stable equilibria (Figure 5b) or even one (Figure 5c). 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of model equilibria with a decrease in bus capacity m for 
Ptotal = 500 and g = 0.2: (a) m = 50, (b) m = 22, (c) m = 15. 
 
The bifurcation diagram for the model (4) for Ptotal = 1000 and varying m and g, is 
presented in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: (a) Full bifurcation diagram of equation (5) for Ptotal = 1000, varying 
m and g, and distribution of willingness-to-wait according to Peterson et al. (2006); 
(b) cross-section of the full diagram for low fraction of captive passengers, g = 0.2; 
(c) cross-section of the full diagram for high fraction of captive passengers, g = 0.8. 
 
5.2. One or two lines?  
Let us consider establishing a bus service in a new area, assuming, for simplicity, 
that the spatial structure of the area enables a public transport service consisting of 
several circular lines only, in order to serve (parts of) the population in a reasonable 
way. Then, the basic question for the public transport operator is whether it is better – 
i.e., more profitable – to operate only one line that serves half of the population or to 
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establish two lines that will serve twice as much potential passengers but with only 
half of the total number of buses per line?  
Let us apply the model of the vicious cycle for the simplest case of an area that is 
characterized by uniform distributions of captive and non-captive passengers. Given a 
number of buses B and their size m, we compare one line of length L that serves 
gPtotal captives and (1-g)Ptotal non-captive passengers by B buses to two non-related 
lines of length L, each serving gPtotal captive riders and (1-g)Ptotal non-captive 
passengers with B/2 buses. Formally, the situation of two lines is identical to the 
situation of a line which length is 2L and which is served by the same number B of 
buses as the line of a length L.  
In the first case, the interval between buses will be L/B, and the potential number 
of passengers Ptotal, while in the case of two lines, the interval between buses will be 
2L/B, but with a potential number of passengers of 2Ptotal. The dynamics of the 
number of passengers for each case, by quarters of a year, are given by:   
                                       
 
  
    
               (6) 
                                         
 
   
    
            (7) 
As can be seen directly from (6) – (7) in case of a majority of captive passengers, 
i.e. g ~ 1, two lines are preferable – in both cases          passengers will be served, 
twice more than in case of one line, no matter what are the other parameters of the 
system.  
However, in case of a non-captive majority, the situation is different: until the 
frequency of buses 2L/B is sufficient to pass the threshold that is necessary for 
entering the virtuous cycle, it is worth to put all buses into one line and not to serve 
the second line at all. For the intermediate values of g the situation becomes more 
complex: depending on the population density (Ptotal/L), the number of equilibria for 
one line of length L can be different form the number of equlibria of the two-line 
situation. We delay the study of this case to future papers.    
6. Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper, we have presented an analytical model for analyzing the vicious and 
virtuous cycles in public transport based on passengers’ decisions to use a public 
transport service dependent on waiting time. While based on a number of simplifying 
assumptions – a single line instead of a transportation network, a uniform distribution 
of captive and non-captive passengers in space and over the day and zero operation 
costs - the model shows that service provision will either enter a vicious or virtuous 
cycle. The dynamics of the vicious cycle converges to an equilibrium that is 
characterized by low service frequency and low ridership, while the dynamics of the 
virtuous cycle converges to equilibrium of high service frequency and high ridership. 
We have analyzed the conditions of the vicious or virtuous cycle based on available 
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field data regarding passengers’ variation in willingness-to-wait for a public transport 
service. The analysis substantially adds to the discussion by Levinson and Krizek 
(2008) who used hypothetical dependencies between the frequency of buses and the 
number of passengers. In future work, we aim to address the issues of non-uniform 
distribution of passengers over space, variation in trip lengths and real-time travel 
information provided through smart phones. 
Despite intentionally simplifying assumptions, we argue that a number of practical 
lessons can be drawn from the analysis of our abstract model. Let us address two 
situations that typify a large part of the world: city regions in wealthy countries and 
city regions in rapidly developing but relatively poor countries. 
Typically, city regions in wealthy countries like the US, Japan, or in Western-
European countries, are characterized by low shares of captive riders. Total number of 
potential passengers in these city regions depends highly on urban structure. In low 
density sprawling areas, public transport lines, if still existent, will inevitably enter a 
vicious cycle if subsidies are terminated (Figure 3a). In denser areas, with a clustering 
of employment and other activities in a limited number of centers, the possible line 
dynamics are probably best described by Figure 3c and both a vicious and a virtuous 
cycle may be possible:  
 Frequencies on many public transport lines will be below the B*int  level and 
so are potentially in a vicious cycle. The level of service on these lines will currently 
be maintained by subsidies. However, as the share of captive riders drops over time 
due to increasing real incomes and related car ownership, these lines will keep facing 
a decreasing ridership and thus subsidies will inevitably have to increase. This may 
not be possible due to budget limitations, forcing a further decrease in service. In real-
world circumstances with limited budgets, a vicious cycle therefore seems inevitable, 
even if the public transport service is fully regulated. Eventually, these lines will 
converge to a politically acceptable minimal level of service or will be terminated 
altogether.   
 Some lines may actually be close to the B*int level. For these lines, a 
temporary increase in subsidy combined with a requirement to increase the bus 
frequency may lead to a virtuous cycle. If subsidies are maintained long enough, the 
line, through the virtuous cycle, would converge to high equilibrium. Note that 
subsidies could be reduced (substantially) at the moment the high equilibrium is 
reached, depending on operating costs and fare box revenues, suggesting that short-
term increases in subsidies may actually lead to a better level-of-service and lower 
annual subsidies in the long-run.  
 Few lines may already be above the B*int level, but be part of integrated 
subsidized tenders. In such cases, the public transport operator has no incentive to 
increase the level of service on these lines. It may be considered to take these lines out 
of the tenders and to allow operation on a commercial basis only, to trigger public 
transport operators to make better use of the potential offered by the virtuous cycle. 
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Other lines may benefit from this split, both from the increase in per line subsidy and, 
through a network effect, from a total increase in ridership. 
Recent social shifts, such as a decreasing car ownership among young adults and a 
leveling out of car mobility in a number of Western countries, suggest that high-
density cities may actually experience an increase in the share of (voluntarily) captive 
passengers over the coming decade. This can be a trigger for a virtuous cycle on an 
increasing number of public transport lines. The experiences in Berlin, as reported by 
Reinhold (2008), show that it is indeed possible to ‘engineer’ a virtuous cycle for 
particular bus lines by increasing service frequency. However, the Berlin bus system 
is still heavily subsidized and service frequency is determined top-down rather than in 
direct response to passenger demand. It thus remains unclear whether the virtuous 
cycle for the main bus lines there is due to sustained subsidies or whether these lines 
could maintain a high equilibrium without government support.  
Overall, our analysis suggests that in wealthy countries it might be attractive, both 
in terms of ridership and total subsidy needs, to change from area-based tenders of 
public transport service  (Farsi et al., 2007) to a system that makes a distinction 
between bus lines vis-à-vis the vicious/virtuous cycle, in spite of the possible 
drawbacks of such a system.  
Urban public transport services in the emerging economies are often in a 
completely different situation. They are usually characterized by a large potential 
passenger population and a large share of captive riders. However, several 
developments suggest that these cities may rapidly move into a situation in which a 
vicious cycle could occur. First, these cities are experiencing a rapid increase in car 
ownership. Second, operating costs and therefore ticket prices are likely to increase 
over the coming decade, due to higher demand for quality of vehicles/services and 
increasing labor costs. Taken together, these development suggest a decreasing share 
of captive riders and a lower use of public transport among non-captive riders, which 
may in turn induce operators to reduce frequencies, with a risk of entering the vicious 
circle. The challenge for these cities will be to identify impending vicious cycles and 
prevent them from happening through ‘early-bird’ subsidies and/or strategies to 
reduce operating costs and increase service frequencies, such as free bus lanes and 
traffic light priority, in order to return to a path of a virtuous cycle. If successful, this 
may also reduce the rate with which the captive population will turn into a non-
captive one.  
A final observation regards the importance of the use of models for studying the 
possible development of the transportation system over time. Currently, virtually all 
transportation-planning agencies, whether dealing with public and/or private 
transport, use static and aggregate models to analyze the dynamics of real-world 
transport systems. The models are static in nature, in that they assume that future 
travel demand can be forecasted largely independently of future transport 
infrastructure or transport policies. The models are aggregate in that they do not 
simulate the behavior of the individual traveler. As such, these models are insufficient 
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for simulating the interrelationships between the users of the transport system, the 
impacts of policies over time, and the intricate relation between short-and long-term 
dynamics of the transport system. Static aggregate transport models tend to generate 
results that satisfy predicted demand, but cannot identify possibilities to change the 
system through measures which impact becomes only apparent over time. Our study 
underscores that high-resolution dynamic models may substantially enrich 
transportation modeling and, in its wake, transportation policies.   
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Appendix A 
Let us analytically investigate equilibria of the equation 
                                    
 
 
    
              (A1) 
The first derivative of the F(B(t)) by B is given by  
  
  
              
   
 
 
 
  
  (A2) 
and is positive for all B, because f() is always positive. That is, F(B) 
monotonously grows with the growth of B. In case f() is monotonous, equilibria of 
(A1) and their stability can be fully investigated analytically. Indeed, for monotonous 
f(), equilibria and their stability is defined by whether the function F(B(t)) is concave 
or convex. The latter is defined by the second derivative of the F(B): 
   
   
               
    
 
 
 
  
 
     
 
 
 
  
   (A3) 
F(B) is concave if the second derivative, given by (A3), is positive and convex if 
it is negative. The sign of the second derivative is defined by     
 
 
  
 
 
    
 
 
  
or, substituting L/B by TB, by   
          
       
  
   (A4) 
We can now specify monotonous function f() that separates between concave and 
convex F(B(t)). Solving differential equation 0 =    τ   
      
 
  we obtain  
  τ  
 
τ 
                      (A5) 
where C is a constant. Assuming that  varies on [    ,     ] and applying 
         
    
    
 we obtain   
         
         
.  
Based on (A5), three options of the dynamics of (A1) for monotonous f() are 
interesting (Figure A1): 
1. For f() = C/2, F(B) is a straight line. In case of high Rtotal, the bus line 
converges to a state in which all potential passengers use it. In case of low Rtotal, the 
system converges to a stable equilibrium            (Figure A1b). 
2. For f() that decreases slower than C/2, e.g., f() = C/ the system always 
converges to a single equilibrium (         , in which almost all passengers use 
the bus line (Figure A1a). 
3. For f() that decreases faster than C/2, e.g. f() = C/, one equilibrium is 
characteristic of the system in case of low Rtotal, and two in case of high Rtotal. The 
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single or the lower of the two equilibria is always stable. The higher of two equilibria 
is always unstable (Figure A1c). 
 
Figure A1. The shape of F(B) in case of f() = C/ f() = C/2 and f() = C/3. The 
four curves A-D in each figure differ in terms of the fraction of captive  passengers g 
(low/high) and overall number of potential passengers Rtotal (low/high): (A) Rtotal = 02, 
g = 0.2, (B) Rtotal = 20, g = 0.8, (C) Rtotal = 70, g = 0.2, and (D) Rtotal = 70, g = 0.8. 
 
To conclude, monotonous f() always results in the vicious cycle in case f() 
decreases, with , faster than C/2, and always results in the virtuous cycle in case f() 
decreases, with , slower than C/2.  
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Appendix B 
If  then 
                          
 
  
            
 
  
  
                          
 
  
            
 
  
 
Let: 
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   ;           ; and              
Equation (B1) can be thus presented as: 
                           (B2) 
                                
And in a matrix form as: 
 
    
    
   
    
    
  
  
  
  
To find the eigenvalues of matrix  
    
    
  we have to solve the equation: 
                       
Let us denote             ; the roots of (3) are thus 
     
              
 
 
         
 
  
That is, 
      
and  
               
 
  
         
The solution of equation (B2) thus converges, in days, to the eigenvector 
corresponding to the largest eigenvalue     . The components of this eigenvector  
are as follows: 
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That is, for given , the ratio between the number of potential passengers 
who use the bus and the number of potential passengers who do not use the bus, 
converges, in days, to 
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For  < TB, the equilibrium fraction of bus users characterized by willingness-to-
wait  is, thus, equal to: 
         
 
  
 
 
      
 
  (B3) 
Figure 2, in the main text, shows the effect of  and  on the number of users at 
the equilibrium.  
The number of bus users at d = 90 that are characterized by the willingness–to-
wait  < TB is thus given by: 
                 
 
  
 
 
      
 
  
  
 
 
and depends on the analytical expression of f().  
For example, in case f()is uniform on [0, Tmax] 
             
 
  
 
 
      
 
  
 
   
Where C = 1/Tmax and, analytically, 
                    
 
 
 , where      
             
      
. 
According to (B3), the full model of a bus line is, thus:  
             
    
  
 
 
         
 
     
 
        
 
     
     (B4) 
and it differs from the model in the main text by the additional (first) term in the 
square brackets. This addition, however, does not change in any qualitative way the 
dynamics of the system. Figure B1 repeats Figure 3c in the main text for high Rtotal, 
low g,  = 0.005, and  = 0.50, 0.25 and 0.05 per day (i.e., 
 
 
          ). The only 
significant effect, as can be expected, is the increase in the low equilibrium Blow with 
the decrease in 
 
 
 . 
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Figure B1: Dependence of B(T + 1) on B(T) as expressed by (B4), for the 
distribution of willingness-to-wait according to Peterson et al. (2006), Rtotal = 20, g = 
0.1, and three different values of  
 
 
. The black curve represents the same dependency 
for the simplified model that is investigated in the main text (Figure 3c).   
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Appendix C: Analysis of Levinson and Krizek's (2008) model 
The model presented by Levinson and Krizek (2008) is based on three heuristic 
equations that relate between bus speed v, number of passengers P, and bus waiting 
time W. They do not specify in their analysis which of the equations is chosen for 
performing the time-step transition and we have arbitrarily chosen their second 
equation, as presented in (C2) below: 
                (C1) 
  
    
    
 
   
     
    (C2) 
        
 
           
   (C3) 
To analyze the system we express Pt+1 as a function of Pt, substituting (C1) into (C2): 
         
          
            
 
and, further, substituting (C3) into the result:  
                 
 
    
   
     
   
    
   
     
  (C4) 
Dependency (C4) is presented in Figure C1b, while Figure C1a presents a zoom of 
the coordinate plane for the values of Pt and Pt+1 between 0 and 500. As can be seen, 
the equations of Levinson and Krizek (2008) produce three equilibria as is 
characteristic for a high R and low g, but result in non-realistic values of Bint ≈ 150 
and Bhigh ≈ 1,200,000.  
 
Figure C1: Equilibria of Levinson and Krizek’s (2008) model: (a) dependence of P(T 
+ 1) on P(T) for low values of P(T); and (b) dependence of P(T + 1) on P(T).   
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